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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

ELECTION OF REMEDIES- CONTRACTS INDUCED BY FRAUD In 1939,
plaintiff brought an action alleging in his complaint that defendant became indebted to him on December 17, 1928, for $13,400, for money had and received by defendant to the use of plaintiff. In a bill of particulars plaintiff pointed
out that the indebtedness arose from the purchase of certain bonds and the
subsequent rescission of the contract of purchase prior to the commencement of
this action, basing his right to rescind upon misrepresentations made by, and
the fraud of, defendant in inducing the purchase of said bonds. When defendant
moved for a summary judgment on the ground that an action for money had
and received was barred under the six-year statute of limitations, plaintiff introduced affidavits alleging that the fraud was not discovered until March, 1938.
Held, this action must be treated as one for money had and received and is
therefore extinguished by the six-year statute of limitations. The question
whether an action for damages due to the alleged fraud is barred by the present
action is not before the court.1 Cohen v. City Company of New York, 283
N. Y. 112, 27 N. E. (2d) 803 (1940).
Where a purchaser is fraudulently induced to enter into a contract of purchase by the misrepresentations of the vendor, three remedies are available to
him. First, he may bring an action at law for damages resulting from the
fraud; second, he may sue in equity for rescission of the contract and for restitution of the consideration, or the court may award damages if rescission be
impracticable; or third, he may rescind and, tendering a return of his consideration, sue quasi-contractually for restitution. 2 The last method was attempted in

1 Plaintiff carried this action to judgment on the theory that it was to be treated
as an action for damages, not barred by the statute of limitations. The court felt that
fraud, being alleged in the manner it was here, was not the gravamen of the action
but only incidental thereto and was only the ground for rescission. Thus they could
not disregard the quasi-contractual nature of the complaint.
2 4 Wis. L. REv. 33 (1926); 13 N. C. L. REv. 226 (1935).

RECENT DECISIONS

the principal case and resulted in judgment for defendant due to the statute of
limitations. The court itself posed the question whether an action for damages
for fraud might now be brought, citing cases to indicate, but not deciding, that
the problem of election of remedies is involved. 3 Since plaintiff himself has
already rescinded the contract, a bill in equity for rescission would probably
be barred by the present suit, but that result would be due to the doctrine of
election of rights and not election of remedies. 4 Rescission of the contract by
plaintiff has been a disaffirmance which operates to fix his substantive rights.
There is no longer need for relief which is peculiarly equitable, and the mere
presence of fraud would not enable plaintiff to come into equity. 5 Plaintiff's
right to bring an action for damages for the fraud, however, would involve a
consideration of the doctrine of election of remedies. Stated broadly, the actions
are inconsistent, money had and received being based on disaffirmance of the
contract, damages on the theory that the contract still exists. 6 If only special
damages are requested, however, there is no point of inconsistency.1 There is
authority that the mere filing of the quasi-contract action is a final election precluding all other remedies, if two or more remedies actually exist. 8 But if the one
attempted is barred by the statute of limitations there is no choice and consequently no election. 9 It would then appear, taking even a strict approach to the
doctrine, that a suit for damages after the present action would be successful.
However, it is to be noted that the courts are more and more tending to disfavor
the doctrine of election, especially where by plaintiff's mere mistake he is deprived of a substantial right, and they tend to apply it only in the strictest cases,
analogous to estoppel or res adjudicata.10 In the principal case it appears that
there has been no detrimental change of position by defendant and no estoppel.
There has been no adjudication of plaintiff's right, the action being barred
from hearing. Thus, there really being no double vexation of defendant, and the
first action being in effect non-existent because of the bar of the statute, the
action for damages might be permitted.11
3 Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924);
Clark v. Kirby, 243 N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926).
4 23 WAsH. UNiv. L. Q. 527 (1938).
5 Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700
(1928}; 95 A. L. R. 1000 at 1003 (1935).
6 In these actions, however, purchase-money paid prior to the discovery of the
fraud was included in plaintiff's damages for the deceit. Kvedar v. Shapiro, 98 N. J. L.
225, l 19 A. 104 (1922); Steele v. Scott, 192 Cal. 521, 221 P. 342 (1923); Houze
v. Blackwell, 144 Ga. 700, 87 S. E. 1054 (1915); Way v. Siddall, (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) 299 S. W. 313; Copeland v. Reynolds, 86 N. H. uo, 164 A. 215 (1933).
7 32 M1cH. L. REv. II3 (1933).
8 Donovan v. Curts, 245 Mich. 348,222 N. W. 743 (1929).
9 Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 144 N. E. 592 (1924).
10 Nuveen v. Board of Public Instruction, (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 175,
writ of certiorari denied, 301 U. S. 691, 57 S. Ct. 794 (1937); 38 CoL. L. REV.
292 (1938).
11 On the general problem of election of remedies, see annotation in 3 5 A. L. R.
1153 (1925), and continuing in 123 A. L. R. 378 (1939).

